1. Obligation to work
According to § 4f para. 1 BDSG, public and non-public bodies that automatically collect, process or use personal data must appoint a data protection officer. The transfer of such an office and the associated tasks requires the agreement of the employment contract parties (see BAG March 13, 2007 – 9 AZR 612/05 -). If the employee is appointed as a data protection officer in the existing employment relationship, this is based on a decision of the Tenth Senate of September 29, 2010 (- 10 AZR 588/09 -) regularly the employer’s offer to extend the employment contract to include the tasks associated with the office for its duration in accordance with the legal provisions. If the employee accepts this offer by agreeing to the appointment, the employment contract will be changed for the period of the transfer of office. If the appointment is revoked in accordance with Section 4f Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 BDSG or the office expires in some other way, the activity is no longer part of the contractually owed service. There is no need for a change or partial termination. If the data protection officer has been appointed by a statutory health insurance company, his office will expire if the latter merges with another health insurance company. The office will not be transferred to the newly formed health insurance company in accordance with Section 144 Paragraph 4 Sentence 2 SGB V.
2. Right to issue instructions
Eine Klausel im Arbeitsvertrag einer Redakteurin, nach der der Arbeitgeber befugt ist, ihr andere redaktionelle oder journalistische Aufgaben zu übertragen, berechtigt diesen nach einem Urteil des Neunten Senats vom 23. Februar 2010 (- 9 AZR 3/09 -) nicht, die Redakteurin in eine Service- und Entwicklungsredaktion zu versetzen, in der sie ausschließlich Testbeiträge für neue Verlagsprodukte erarbeiten muss. Nach allgemeinem Verständnis ist es Aufgabe eines Redakteurs, aus der Fülle von Informationen die für die Leser, Zuhörer oder Zuschauer bedeutsamen Beiträge für die nächste Ausgabe oder Sendung aufzubereiten. Er erstellt Beiträge, die zur Veröffentlichung bestimmt sind. Hieran fehlt es bei einer Tätigkeit in einer Service- und Entwicklungsredaktion, in der auf nicht absehbare Zeit Beiträge nur zu Test- oder Entwicklungszwecken bearbei-tet werden. Ob die Versetzungsklausel einer Kontrolle nach §§ 305 ff. BGB standgehal-ten hätte, konnte dahinstehen. In der Entscheidung vom 25. August 2010 (- 10 AZR 275/09 -) hatte der Zehnte Senat sich mit der Prüfung eines in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen enthaltenen Versetzungsvorbehalts zu befassen. Der Senat hat dazu folgende Grundsätze aufgestellt: Durch Auslegung der vertraglichen Regelungen ist zunächst zu ermitteln, ob ein be-stimmter Tätigkeitsinhalt und -ort vertraglich festgelegt wurde. Enthält der Vertrag hier-über eine nähere Festlegung, so unterliegt diese keiner Angemessenheitskontrolle iSv. § 307 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BGB, da es sich um eine inhaltliche Bestimmung der Hauptpflicht handelt. Ist der Inhalt der Leistungspflicht im Arbeitsvertrag nicht festgelegt, ergibt sich der Umfang des arbeitgeberseitigen Weisungsrechts aus § 106 GewO. Auf die Zuläs-sigkeit eines vereinbarten Versetzungsvorbehalts kommt es dann nicht mehr an. Ent-hält der Vertrag neben einer Festlegung von Art oder Ort der Tätigkeit einen Verset-zungsvorbehalt, unterliegt dieser nicht der gesetzlichen Angemessenheitskontrolle, wenn er inhaltlich der Regelung des § 106 Satz 1 GewO entspricht. Dabei muss die vertragliche Regelung die Beschränkung auf den materiellen Gehalt des § 106 GewO unter Berücksichtigung der für Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen geltenden Ausle- gungsgrundsätze aus sich heraus erkennen lassen. Geht der Vorbehalt über § 106 GewO hinaus, findet eine uneingeschränkte Inhaltskontrolle nach § 307 Abs. 1 BGB statt. Behält sich der Arbeitgeber vor, die vertraglich vereinbarte Tätigkeit unter Einbeziehung geringerwertiger Tätigkeiten einseitig ohne den Aus-spruch einer Änderungskündigung zulasten des Arbeitnehmers ändern zu können, so liegt darin regelmäßig eine unangemessene Benachteiligung iSd. § 307 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 iVm. Abs. 2 Nr. 1 BGB. Erweist sich die Versetzung danach als unwirksam, so hat der Arbeitnehmer auch dann einen Anspruch auf Beschäftigung mit seiner bisherigen Tä-tigkeit am bisherigen Ort, wenn Inhalt und Ort der Arbeitsleistung im Vertrag nicht ab-schließend festgelegt sind, sondern dem Weisungsrecht des Arbeitgebers nach § 106 GewO unterliegen.
3. Working time
In its judgment of June 23, 2010 (- 10 AZR 543/09 -), the Tenth Senate had to examine the compatibility of the working time regulations in Section 5, Section II of the general collective agreement for the chemical industry (MTV) with the ArbZG. Afterwards, among other things, apply: for the company fire department, so-called 24-hour services, which consist of eight hours of working time, a standby period for work and a standby rest period. The Senate considered the collective bargaining regulations to be permissible on the basis of Section 7 Paragraph 2a of the ArbZG. According to this standard, the working hours per working day can be extended beyond eight hours in a collective agreement without compensation if the working hours regularly and to a considerable extent include work availability or on-call duty and special regulations ensure that the health of the employees is not endangered. The regulation allows collective bargaining provisions according to which the average weekly working time continuously exceeds 48 hours. This is the case with 24-hour shifts in accordance with Section 5, Section II of the MTV, since standby rest also includes working hours in the sense of. Section 2 Paragraph 1 ArbZG represents. To the extent that Section 7 (2a) of the ArbZG requires “special regulations” to ensure the health of employees, the general requirements of occupational health and safety law – such as the preparation of a risk analysis in accordance with Section 5 of the ArbSchG – are not sufficient. Additional regulations that go beyond the law are required. For the factory fire brigade, Section 5 Section II MTV in conjunction with. The company agreements concluded here ensure that the health of the employees is not endangered. The Senate was able to leave open whether the possibility of extending working hours granted to the collective bargaining parties by Section 7 Paragraph 2a of the ArbZG violates Article 22 of Directive 2003/88/EC of November 4, 2003. Even if the ArbZG had to set certain requirements for compliance with the general principles of safety and health protection of employees as well as the necessary measures, Section 7 Paragraph 2a ArbZG, including the collective agreements between private parties concluded on this basis, remains applicable. In view of this, there was no obligation to submit the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union due to the lack of relevance to the decision.
4. Staffing
Through the law on the integration of the pension offices into the general administration of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (VersÄmtEinglG), those employed at the dissolved pension offices in North Rhine-Westphalia are transferred by law to other state authorities or are assigned to municipal corporations by way of staff provision while continuing their employment relationship Land has been made available to carry out the task. In its judgment of July 14, 2010 (– 10 AZR 182/09 –), the Tenth Senate considered the provision of personnel based on the VersÄmt-EinglG to be legally effective. There was no need to resort to a contractual or collective legal basis. The VersÄmtEinglG is compatible with higher-ranking law. The state legislature had the power to legislate. The interference with the employees’ freedom to exercise their appointments, which is protected by Article 12 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, is justified by reasonable reasons of the common good. This also applies to any interference by the law with the collective bargaining autonomy protected by Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law. When drawing up the allocation plan provided for in the VersÄmtEinglG, through which the employees were assigned to the respective municipal corporations, the state was allowed to use a points scheme. With regard to the purpose of the selection – the change in the place of employment – there was no objection to the fact that age and length of service were given less weight compared to other factors. This did not violate the AGG. However, regardless of the points scheme used, it still had to be checked individually for each employee whether the measure was reasonable for them, taking into account business concerns and social criteria. The decisive factor was the point in time at which the employer had to make the discretionary decision. The staff councils of the transferring departments did not have a right of co-determination when it came to staffing. This is not a transfer in the sense of the word. § 72 Paragraph 1 No. 5 LPVG NW. An analogous application of this standard is not possible because there is no unintentional loophole in the law. The Senate was able to leave open whether the integration into the receiving office required the co-determination of the local staff council in accordance with Section 72 Paragraph 1 No. 1 LPVG NW. The lack of participation by the staff council only gives rise to the employee’s right to refuse performance if the staff council requests that the measure be repealed. This was not the case.
5. Reference clauses
A clause in an employment contract concluded by a collective bargaining employer before January 1, 2002 (so-called old contract), which refers to the collective agreements relevant to the company, is, according to the case law of the Fourth Senate, regularly to be interpreted as an equal opportunity agreement for reasons of protection of trust(BAG 18. April 2007 – 4 AZR 652/05 -). This is according to a Senate decision of January 27, 2010 (- 4 AZR 570/08 -) does not contradict the fact that the old contract refers to a collective agreement that was largely declared to be generally binding at the time the contract was concluded. Despite the generally binding nature of the collective agreements, the interests underlying the previous case law on equal opportunity agreements exist for the employer who is bound by the collective agreement at the time the contract is concluded by virtue of membership in the employers’ association (see BAG December 1, 2004 – 4 AZR 50/04 -). This follows from the fact that a generally binding declaration is valid for a maximum of the term of the collective agreement that has been declared generally binding. In addition, the individual employer has no direct influence on whether their intention to achieve equality is already safeguarded by the generally binding declaration, since the right to apply for this lies with the unions and associations that conclude collective agreements. A simple dynamic reference clause in an old contract that refers to a collective agreement that would not apply normatively in the employment relationship in accordance with Section 4 Paragraph 1 and Section 3 Paragraph 1 TVG, even if the contracting parties were mutually bound by collective bargaining agreements, cannot be interpreted as an equal opportunity agreement. The Fourth Senate made this clear in a judgment of October 21, 2009 (– 4 AZR 396/08 –). The prerequisite for interpreting a dynamic reference clause as an equal opportunity agreement is the relevance of the collective agreement referred to in the contract. This is missing when referring to a collective agreement that is not relevant in terms of its geographical scope. In the event of a business transfer, the business purchaser who is not bound by a collective agreement is therefore bound to the dynamics of the referral clause contractually agreed between the employee and the business transferor in accordance with Section 613a Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 BGB. This binding neither violates the purchaser’s negative freedom of association under Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law nor does it violate provisions of Union law. In a decision of May 19, 2010 (– 4 AZR 796/08 –), the Fourth Senate dealt with the interpretation of a reference clause in the employment contract, according to which “the provisions of the Federal Employee Collective Agreement (BAT) in the respective employment relationship apply to the employment relationship valid version” apply. Since the regulation is only designed to be time-dynamic and not content-dynamic, it does not generally cover the public service collective agreement that came into force on October 1, 2005 for the federal and local governments
(TVöD) nor the collective agreement for the public service of the states that came into force on November 1, 2006 (TV-L). However, the dynamic design of the referral results in the parties’ desire to dynamically align the working conditions with collective bargaining developments in the public service. As a result of tariff succession and the lack of continuation of the tariff framework referred to, the dynamic reference clause has become incomplete. This gap in the regulations must be closed by means of a supplementary interpretation of the contract so that the tariff regulations that replace it are taken into account. Due to the splitting of the collective bargaining regulations, which were largely identical until October 2005, into those of the TVöD and the TV-L, it is also necessary to determine which successor regulation the employment contract parties would have agreed upon by means of the supplementary contract interpretation. In case of doubt, this is the collective agreement that would typically apply if the activities carried out were carried out within the public service.
6. Occupational safety specialist
According to Section 8 Paragraph 2 ASiG, the occupational safety specialists or, if several specialists are appointed for a company, the senior occupational safety specialist report directly to the head of the company. According to a ruling by the Ninth Senate of December 15, 2009 (– 9 AZR 769/08 –), the regulation establishes an obligation for the employer to report the employed – managerial – occupational safety specialist directly to the head of the company in terms of both technical and disciplinary matters. This requirement also applies in the area of public administration. The ASiG does not apply directly there. However, § 16 ASiG establishes the obligation to ensure occupational safety that is equivalent to the principles of the ASiG. The prominent positioning of occupational safety specialists in the company hierarchy is one of the structural principles of the ASiG. This ensures the independence of these functionaries and strengthens their influence. Therefore, the public employer is also required to report the – senior – occupational safety specialist directly to the head of the department or authority for which he or she is appointed, both from a technical and disciplinary point of view. In this respect, the specialist has a legally enforceable claim. With your appointment, your contractual rights and obligations, as far as they relate to your position and activity in the company, are based on the ASiG. The local self-administration right of the municipalities from Art. 28 para.